Theology in Sickness and in Health

I'm just taking a quick breath in the midst of my present attempt to articulate (with concision!, and clarity) the problems with Blackburn's supervenience challenge to the moral realist (see Blackburn 1993, Essays in Quasi Realism, essays 6 & 7).

Ben Myers has blogged in brief today on Karl Barth and a Christian theology of sickness & death (Faith and Theology: "Karl Barth on sickness, health, and doctors"). And already this entry has generated a little discussion.

Myers and Kim Fabricius note a tension in Christian theology between, as I take it, God's opposition to sickness and death as the Creator of life and sustainer of health on the one hand, and God's permission of human mortality on the other.

For example, Myers says (citing Barth) that it is in virtue of "God’s own opposition to sickness" that "doctors and patients are together following God’s will as they resist the demonic power of sickness". Fabricius then opines (based on his reading of Genesis 2-3) that "it is not death but the fear of death that is the condition of fallen humanity, and not the disintegration of the human body (which in fact begins at birth) but our frenetic attempt to avoid and delay it at all costs that speaks of the sin of pride," and he goes on to note that the Apostle Paul remarked that "dying is gain" and boasted of his physical infirmities.

(I say:) It seems Paul came to accept his own death as good, right, and proper, situated in God's plan for Paul's life as a small piece of God's plan for the unfolding of His Kingdom. Yet Jesus also healed the sick and raised the dead as a sign of the immanence of the Kingdom of God.

Some application: On the one hand, we are on God's side in condemning and resisting sickness, decay, and death. On the other hand, we are on God's side in accepting an end to (this) life from His hand, knowing perhaps that physical, literal death is a necessary precondition for the resurrection of the (superior) body.

So with fear and trembling and proper humility, we should fight to live, but not condemn others who wish to accept death (rather than say one more round of chemo); also we should accept death, but not condemn others who fervently desire to go on living. James' admonishment against boasting about the future in 4:13-16 seems appropriate here: "You ought to say, 'If the Lord wills, we will live...'"

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I wonder also if this tension might have bearing on Michael's questions regarding the benefit of the doctrine of Providence ("The Purpose of Providence"). To quote Myers:

"After speaking of sickness as a demonic threat which must always be resisted, Barth goes on to say that real freedom to live comes only when a person realises "that he is in God's hand, that he is surrounded by Him on all sides", i.e., when we accept the limitations of our own lives. And so Barth also says that sickness "ushers in this genuinely liberating insight". In a "concealed" form, sickness is also "the witness to God's creative goodness, the forerunner and messenger of the eternal life which God has allotted and promised to the person who is graciously preserved by Him within the confines of his time" ([Church Dogmatics] III/4, p. 373)"

Michael's questioning points me to ask the frightening question: "What can I trust God for?" It seems we know so little of God's will, such that He may allow or prevent fatal highway accidents. This not only raises the epistemic question: "Is faith in God falsifiable?", but the acute existential question: "Does God really take care of me?"

Myers' quotation of Barth suggests an answer which my philosophically-trained instincts have already prompted: God always acts for my good (and, I believe, for every person's good and for all our good together), and sometimes what is good for me is mortality; other times what is good for me is healing. Ultimately, on my reading of scripture, God says what is good for me is eternal life: both spiritual (now & ongoing) and literal (future) resurrection from the dead.

If universal restorationism is the true view of Hell, then ultimately God will bring every person to their ultimate good: eternal life with God. If annihilationism or ECT is the true view of Hell, on the other hand, I think to be consistent we should say it is for each person's good that they not be brought into the reality of eternal life with God against their will. (Indeed, the restorationist would also say this, but simply leaves the door open to the will of the damned's undergoing change.)

The problem is not, perhaps, that we know so little of the will of God--we know, trivially, that God's will is for our good--but the problem is that we seem to know so little of what is truly our good.

The believer in divine Providence must say that, given our empirical evidence, sometimes it is good for some people to get sick and die; other times it is good for some people to get sick and then get better, or to die and then be resurrected. (Remember Mary & Martha's question to Jesus: Why didn't you come sooner so that Lazarus didn't die in the first place?)

So here are two questions: (1) Can we accept the conclusion that sickness and death (or whatever apaprent evil, including permanent or temporary damnation) is really for the good of those upon whom it befalls? (2) Given this consequence of belief in Providence, does believing in Providence make someone a better person? That is, is the belief itself good?
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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Course Feedback from the Fall

I got my course evaluations for both Logic and World Religions today. A lot of it is what I expected. The majority of comments are positive, and a number of the negative ones are informative and helpful, or just confirming of problems I already knew about and want to address. One of the more helpful comments in World Religions, for example, said that there was more out-of-class work in World Religions than in this student's Anatomy class, which seems backwards. (World Religions here is a 1000 level class, and I took it as two 300 level classes; I knew this would be a problem, I just need to scale back the amount of work a bit more than I did).

The most amusing negative comment was from a student in World Religions. I reproduce it exactly as it appears on my sheet:

Don't grade the paper's so harsh, it's not an english class.

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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Reductionism and Supervenience: A Proof in Modal Logic

Below, I prove that if reductionism is true then the supervenience thesis is true.
(See Simon Blackburn, “Supervenience Revisited” in his Essays in Quasi-Realism, 1993.)

Reductionism: N (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx)

Necessarily, for all x, if x is correctly described by a natural property description represented by G*, then x has the moral property represented by F.

The Supervenience Thesis: N (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))

Necessarily, if something exists that has moral property F and is correctly described by G*, and its being F supervenes on its being G* [or, conversely, it’s being G* underlies its being F], then for all y, if y is G*, then y is F.


All modal operators here are to be understood as involving analytic or conceptual necessity/possibility. (As opposed to, say, metaphysical or natural necessity/possibility).

Supposedly G. E. Moore’s open question argument gives good reason to reject reductionism. Reductionism is equivalent to what Moore called the “naturalistic fallacy”. Blackburn argues that anti-reductionists lack a good explanation for their acceptance of the supervenience thesis.


1. N (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx)
// ∴ N (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))

2. ASM: ~ N ((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))       AIP
3. P ~((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))          from 2
4. W1 ~((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))       from 3
5. W1 ~(~(∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ∨ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))       from 4
6. W1 ~~(∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) & ~(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)       from 5
7. W1 ~(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy) & ~~(∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx))       from 6
8. W1 ~(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)                     from 7
9. W1 (∃y)~(G*y ⊃ Fy)                     from 8
10. W1 (∃y)~(~G*y ∨ Fy)                     from 9
11. W1 (∃y)(~~G*y & ~Fy)                     from 10
12. W1 ~~G*a & ~Fa                     from 11
13. W1 G*a & ~Fa                     from 12
14. W1 G*a                     from 13
15. W1 (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx)                     from 1
16. W1 G*a ⊃ Fa                     from 15
17. W1 Fa                     from 14, 16
18. W1 ~Fa & G*a                     from 13
19. W1 ~Fa                     from 18
20. W1 Fa & ~Fa                     from 17, 19

21. N (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))                     from 2-20, IP
------

"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Martyr's Mirror 5: Are the Anabaptists the True Church?

(...Click below for full post)

From The Martyr's Mirror by Thieleman J. van Braght; translation by Joseph F. Sohm:

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Now the point will be to give the reasons why we have called this whole work, with all the persons contained therein, after the Anabaptists; from which, as the second question, might be asked: whether all the persons mentioned, confessors as well as martyrs, none excepted, confessed the same as what the Anabaptists of this day confess? or whether any believed, practiced, or maintained higher or lower, more or less, in this or that article?

We shall treat these matters separately, and one after the other, giving the reasons as well as the answers.

REASON WHY WE HAVE CALLED THIS WHOLE WORK AFTER THE ANABAPTISTS

The reason which has induced us is twofold:

1. Because, as we have shown clearly, there have been persons in every century, from the beginning of the Gospel all along, who have believed and taught the article of holy baptism, with other articles noted in the margin-on account of which the Anabaptists have received this name-in the very same manner as the Anabaptists, and have, each in his time, instructed, engrafted, and confirmed their contemporaries therein, as may, be seen in the whole history, especially in the first fifteen centuries.

2. Because we have not found mentioned in the writings of authentic authors anything concerning those persons whom we have noted as true witnesses, which conflicts with the above-mentioned doctrines of the Anabaptists. And whenever something has been laid to their charge, which is not in harmony with the uprightness of the faith professed by them, we have shown that the witnesses to such charge were not authentic or acceptable; or that the things brought against them, were committed by them not after but before their conversion; or that, if they at any time have fallen into them, they truly forsook them before their death, and from which all this appears.

But whenever we have found that any, as regards the faith professed, were actually guilty of serious errors, offensive misconceptions, or bad actions, for which the above excuses could not be brought forward; we have dropped such entirely, and not mentioned them; that the pious and most holy witnesses of Jesus Christ might not be defiled with their unclean and unholy leaven.

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Summary:

At issue seems to be that van Braght intends this history to be properly catholic. That is, he doesn’t mean to be restricting the scope of this history to one denomination or tradition, but wants to present a history of the (True) Universal Church. If he leaves certain people or groups out of the picture, it is because they are not part of the True Church in his judgment, and not because they are part of a different denomination.

So, he wants the history to be about the Church, not a particular subset of the Church, and yet he calls the work after the Anabaptists—one particular group. So why does he title the work after the Anabaptists? His response is, basically, that throughout the whole history of the (True) Church, the true Christians have been Anabaptists. “Anabaptists”, for van Braght, does not designate a Reformation tradition with its origins in the 1500s; rather it is the Tradition of the Church.
His identity claim (Anabaptists = The True Church) is based upon (1) a doctrinal definition of the Anabaptist faith, which includes adult baptism along with other beliefs not clearly specified here (Remember I have argued previously that in van Braght’s own view, the practice of adult baptism does not make one part of this tradition by itself; it is not a solely sufficient condition for being an Anabaptist, because he excludes the violent Munsterites from this tradition), and (2) the (impressive!) claim that there have always been Christians (since Jesus, or since Pentecost, anyway) who fit this doctrinal definition.

Anyone guilty of “serious errors” (heresies?), that is, serious departure from the above definition of the Anabaptist faith in thought, word, or deed, have been omitted from the history, in order to limit the scope of this history to the “True Church” that has kept itself pure.

Response:

First:

I remain taken aback, and indeed offended by this approach, insofar as it fails to recognize the legitimacy of most of the Church, and the relevance of most of Church history. It seems like folly to ignore the influence that certain “paedo-baptists” have had on Christian theology, even surely the theology of the Anabaptists:

There is much with which Anabaptists do (and, should, in my view) find fault with in, say, the theologies of Augustine and Luther (regarding the relationship of Church and State for both thinkers, and regarding the hermeneutics of Luther–i.e. his Law-Gospel dialectic). On the other hand, even if doctrines such as the priesthood of all believers and justification by faith can be discovered through legitimate NT exegesis, these doctrines in the mouths of these thinkers, I contend, have influenced many within the Mennonite Church today, and probably the 16th century Anabaptists as well. If we decide (as I am often tempted to do) to reject Luther’s theory of justification for a more Catholic one, the problem persists.

Again, while there were, I understand, those among the 16th century Anabaptists who held to heretical Christologies, I think most good Mennonite-Anabaptists are good Trinitarians. Surely there were paedo-baptists among the members of the Council of Chalcedon. (I would contend that Trinitarian orthodoxy was around before the Council of Nicea; but whether we are ignorant of the councils or not, at least the first four have surely influenced Mennonite thought–just as Luther has with hopefully biblical views such as the priesthood of all believers.)

Further, the way Anabaptists today read the Bible, whether they make use of the historical-critical method or a more fundamentalist approach, necessarily draws on contributions made (quite recently!) by paedo-baptists (many Lutherans on the one hand and many Presbyterians on the other, among others).

All this is to say that even if we were writing a history of Anabaptist denominations, we would have to talk about the influences of non-Anabaptist thinkers.

Second:

I am not sure how van Braght can escape the charge of arbitrariness in choosing what doctrines are marks of “the True Church”. The only way out I can see is by an appeal to biblical authority and good vs. bad exegesis of the scriptures.

Third:

Why should the true, visible Church be identified by its doctrines, primarily?



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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Defining “Natural”: A Philosophical Problem for Discussion

This is something on which I could use some help.

Preface:

“Entities” is to be understood in the broadest possible way. Entities may be existent or non-existent, simple or complex, irreducible or reducible, emergent or fundamental,[1] mental or non-mental, material or immaterial, etc. (Can you think of any significant bases I haven’t covered here?)

Let’s use “naturalism” to refer to the ontological claim that no entities exist that are non-natural.

Something is “non-natural” iff it is not identical to, reducible to, or wholly composed of natural entities.

Aim:

For present purposes, what we want is a definition of “natural” that allows naturalism to be an internally coherent thesis that someone can legitimately defend as a defeasible, a posteriori hypothesis. Naturalists claim that naturalism is a contingent truth.

Preferably, our definition of “natural” will leave room for the class of natural entities to contain more than the class of physical entities. Naturalism should not automatically entail physicalism.

Method:

I take it that in order for naturalism to be a posteriori and a contingent truth, it must be possible to present an argument for naturalism that is not circular or question-begging. (Perhaps the argument will finally be judged unsound; what matters right now is not the truth value of naturalism but its alleged contingency.)

I take it that the best argument available for naturalism is an argument from the empirical, meta-scientific observation of explanatory completeness[2] something like what follows (this a specifically physicalist version of the argument; I want to explore ways to modify the argument to make it apply to more inclusive forms of naturalism):

Scientific research of the last hundred years or so has had great success in finding physical (hence, natural) explanations for observed phenomena. There is no longer any reason (so the argument goes) to postulate the existence of any special, non-physical entities in order to account for observable, physical effects. Hence, the thesis of

“the ‘causal closure’ or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm,
according to which all physical effects can be accounted for by basic physical
causes (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of
fundamental forces)”[3]

has been well-confirmed. The methodological consideration of simplicity thus justifies the ontological hypothesis that the only fundamental entities that exist are those entities which make up the subject matter of physics.

First Try:

The history of science may be taken to confirm physicalism [see above] or else the thesis that there are no unexplainable phenomena. (Note: by definition, “phenomena” is restricted to the realm accessible to our observation). So naturalism could be the claim that we don’t need to posit any queer, non-scientific, supersensible entities in order to give (efficient) causal explanations of any observable phenomena. (We may consequently be justified to infer that there are no such entitites.) Everything we can observe can in principle be explained by other things that we observe, without recourse to the unobservable.

If we said that to be “natural” is to be observable (“non-natural” = “unobservable”), could we call the claim that nothing non-natural is a necessary component of an (efficient) causal explanation a scientific discovery, a posteriori, or a contingent truth?

No. Because something is observable by definition insofar as it causally generates observable effects; and if this is right, then it is an analytic truth, known a priori, “discovered” on reflection rather than observation, that all necessary posits of scientific explanations are observable, or “natural” on the above definition. (If I’m wrong and something can be non-observable but generate observable effects–subatomic particles, for example–then we have to reject our definition of “natural” because we want subatomic particles to count as “natural”, since the physical is supposed to be the paradigm case of the natural.)

Conclusion: This try hasn’t worked because the key claim turns out not to be a confirmable, defeasible, scientific hypothesis but rather a conceptual truth.

Help Desired!!

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[1] By “fundamental” I intend “non-emergent”…can you please confirm or correct my terminology here?

[2] See David Papineau, “Naturalism”, §1.2-1.3, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/. I call this observation “meta-scientific” because it is a general observation about the fruits of recent scientific inquiry, rather than a particular observation that occurs within a particular scientific research program.

[3] Papineau, “Naturalism”, §1.2.
------

"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Readings on Philosophical Naturalism

I was awake early this morning so I came to campus very early, getting to Scott Hall around 7:00am. I found that the alarm was going off all throughout the building. So, I'm sitting in a computer lab in the Business Dept. this morning.

Yesterday I got three books and an article on philosophical naturalism. (I'll probably only read the introductions to each of the three books). I may have comments later--today or in a couple of days--related to this topic.

The books are:

Naturalism in question, Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds.) (Harvard, 2004)

Naturalism: a critical appraisal, Stephen Wagner and Richard Warner (eds.) (Notre Dame, 1993)

Naturalism: a critical analysis, William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (eds.) (Routledge, 2000)

The third book (Craig & Moreland's) is much more thoroughly and explicitly Christian/theistic in its orientation. The second (Wagner & Warner's) is more about philosophical non-naturalism without as much reference to theism (I think). The first is interested in broadening the scope of "nature" beyond the limits of "scientific naturalism" or "scientism".

I'm presently interested in this topic because philosophical naturalism is an important presupposition of certain expressivist arguments in metaethics.

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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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A little moral epistemology

I cycled to campus for the second morning in a row (the third time ever). I estimate it takes about 30 minutes (give or take 5). I saves me a dollar on bus fare and whatever I'd pay to ride a stationary bike at a fitness center (although I'm sure it isn't constant activity the way aerobic exercise should be--it's actually an easy ride).

No rain today, so my tires are cleaner and my brakes are working better than yesterday. :)

I'm noticing that I'm out of practice with regular, spontaneous praise and thanksgiving. I don't spend enough time outside, being, wondering, enjoying--as Michael's been saying, properly playing. :) I think that means I need to spend serious time in the Psalter.

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Note to self:

One of the more serious challenges for moral realism is moral epistemology. How can we know normative truths?

I suspect that moral knowing involves empirical investigation (a posteriori knowing) into what contributes to a certain notion of eudaimonia/well-being/happiness/a good life (or, on the flip side, what contributes to a certain notion harm). Thus far I think I'm in basic agreement with the Cornell realists--the reigning metaethical naturalists. But this empirical knowledge is not where our normative concepts of, e.g., well-being come from.

I suspect that our concepts of well-being properly originate partly in revelation (a posteriori, but not perhaps empirical knowing) and are partly innate (a priori knowing). I understand innate concepts as concepts that we form for the first time when we first use them to cognize something in our experience. So to say that we have innate concepts of well-being means that when we experience well-being (or a privation of well-being)--either for ourselves or in observation of others' lives--we recognize it as such. Such cognition is not necessarily infallible just because it involves native concepts.

I am open to both special revelation filling out and correcting our conceptions of well-being and privation of well-being, and to some form of internal spiritual regeneration (a la Plantinga's WCB model) doing the same.

(Comments welcome from all on the above!)

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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Prayer for this morning...

I have had a beautiful morning already. :)

I missed the 7:30am bus, so I decided to bike all the way to the university (I probably got there ten minutes sooner than I would have if I had waited forty minutes for the next bus by my apartment).

It was raining. :)

It was a very good morning to cycle through the residential streets to the bike trail that leads to the UT campus. There were many green trees overhead.

So, my jeans are damp, and I'm trying to cultivate a proper mood of praise and thanksgiving and wonderment in the creation.

Psalm 65

Praise is due to you, O God, in Zion,
and to you shall vows be performed.

[...]

Blessed is the one you choose and bring near,
to dwell in your courts!
We shall be satisfied with the goodness of your house,
the holiness of your temple!

[...]

You visit the earth and water it;
you greatly enrich it;
the river of God is full of water;
you provide their grain,
for so you have prepared it.
You water its furrows abundantly,
settling its ridges,
softening it with showers,
and blessing its growth.
You crown the year with your bounty;
your wagon tracks overflow with abundance.
The pastures of the wilderness overflow,
the hills gird themselves with joy,
the meadows clothe themselves with flocks,
the valleys deck themselves with grain,
they shout and sing together for joy.

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From Take Our Moments and Our Days: An Anabaptist Prayer Book - Ordinary Time
         Wednesday morning

Call to Praise
Lord, open our lips
and our mouths will proclaim your praise.
You are good to those who wait for you,
to all who seek you.

Gloria Patri...

Psalm 103

Thanksgiving
My heart is ready, O God;
I will sing your praise.
Your steadfast love is higher than the heavens,
and your faithfulness reaches to the clouds.

(free prayers of thanksgiving)

Be exalted, O God, above the heavens,
and let your glory shine all over the earth.

Amen.

Mark 11:25; Ephesians 4:30-5:2

Silent or spoken reflection on the readings.


------

"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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An Orthodox prayer for this morning...

A Prayer to the Holy Trinity

Arising from sleep I thank You, O Holy Trinity, for because of the abundance of Your goodness and long-suffering Your wrath is not incensed against me, slothful and sinful as I am; neither have You destroyed me in my transgressions: but in Your compassion, You raised me up as I lay in despair; so that I might sing the glories of Your Majesty this day. Do now enlighten the eyes of my understanding, open my mouth to receive Your words, teach me Your commandments, and help me to do Your will, confessing You from my heart, and singing and praising Your perfect and Holy Name: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: now and ever, and unto ages of ages. Amen.

From the Red Prayer Book (Autocephalus Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America) [alt.]

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Songs of Ascent for this morning. (Selected from the BCP Daily Office.)

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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Jesus taught that we should die for our friends and love (oops! I mean kill!) our enemies?

I've been reading a relatively new Orson Scott Card novel which looked interesting. I thought I was going to enjoy it for its philosophical depth after the first few pages, but it quickly became reminiscient of a pop Christian apocalyptic novel (right now Clowns of God is the only such book I would recommend to anyone). The book in question is called Empire, and it's about a near-future American Civil War.

I have found it difficult at times to relate to the main characters because of their political views, although I admit they are an interesting family. They're an Army family; the main character is a U.S. Army Major (who is an Orthodox Christian of Serbian extraction, but religion seems to have even less relevance in the lives of these characters than in the characters of Ender's Game).

I wanted to comment here on one conversation in the middle of the book, between the wife of the Major and one of their sons:

"And you're nine years old, right?" asked Cecily.

I know you think I read too much fantasy," said Nick, "but this is what it's all about. Power. Somebody dies, somebody leaves, everybody comes in and tries to take over. And you just have to hope that the good guys are strong enough and smart enough and brave enough to win."

"Are they?"

"In the fantasy novels," said Nick. "But in the real world, the bad guys win all the time. Genghis Khan tore up the world. Hitler lost in the end, but he killed millions of people first. Really bad stuff happens. Evil people get away with it. You think I don't know that?"

Our children are way too smart for their own good, thought Cecily. "Nick, you're absolutely right. So do you know what we do? We make an island. We make a caslte. We dig a moat around it and we put up walls that are strong, made of stone."

"I guess you're not talking about Aunt Margaret's house," said Nick.

"You know what I'm talking about," said Cecily. "I'm talking about family, and faith. Here in this house, we're not trying to take advantage. Our family doesn't profit from the death of the king. Our family always has enough to share, even if we don't have enough to eat. Do you understand?"

"Sure," said Nick. "That's church talk. Because Dad has a weapon and goes out and kills the bad guys. He doesn't just hide in a castle inside a moat and help the poor and the sick."

"Your dad," said Cecily, "does not go out and kill the bad guys. He goes out and does what he's ordered to do, and the goal is to persuade the bad guys that they won't get their way by killing people, so they'd better stop."

"Mom," said Nick, "all you're saying is that our Army persuades them to stop killing people by being better at killing people than they are."

She slumped back in her chair. "Hard to reconcile that with Christianity, isn't it?"

"No it's not," said Nick. " 'Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends.' "

"You listen?"

"I read."

I recognize that many people talk and think in the way this suggests to me. The mother character seems to endorse this pattern of thinking in her son here. But surely you don't have to be radically liberal or a Christian pacifist in order to see that there is not a connection between the Jesus quotation and the "carry a big stick" / "M.A.D." policies suggested by Nick's summary characterization of U.S. Army policy?

That is to say, there doesn't seem to be a logical connection in my mind between the righteousness of letting oneself be killed for one's friends and that of being willing to kill one's enemies.

------

"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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A story of forgiveness in the spirit of Christian nonviolence

This morning I heard a story on BBC News Hour (on Michigan Radio) about a woman who forgave her daughter's killers. Apparently her daughter was killed in her 20s, in 1993, in South Africa, where she was working nonviolently for freedom in South Africa. Her killers were also freedom activists, but did not believe in nonviolence (and they apparently didn't know whose 'side' the woman who was killed was on). On the radio story they interviewed the mother, who was recently recognized by a leader in South Africa for her outstanding example of forgiveness. The radio story said that she not only forgave and embraced her daughter's killers, she employed and befriended them.

This is what I could find online about this:
http://www.theforgivenessproject.com/stories/fourie-letlapa
and
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/outlook/news/story/2007/11/071119_ginn_outlook.shtml

If you want to hear the interview that I did try listening here:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/newshour.shtml
You can try clicking the updated link at the top of the page, or click "Listen Again" on the right side. I think what I listened to would be Newshour 1300 GMT, Thursday.

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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Anxiety

Worry is silly, really.

I was just about to post briefly, requesting prayer because I am mentally very tired this morning, feel anxious about how much thesis writing I can really get done in the next few weeks, and am being strongly tempted to worry about money.

Part of the reason for my worry had to do with an email I had read a few minutes before. However, I received another email just as I was logging on that showed me I didn't really need to be so worried about that particular thing.

What I really need is patience. So much of worry is (in my experience) rooted in a desire to know the future *now*. I need to trust in the Omniscience.

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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Listening to Rev. Wright

Listening to Rev. Wright: On Point (NPR, April 29, 2008)

Please listen to the above show!!!

(Political Rant Warning!)

There was a really great show on Michigan Radio (NPR) on Tuesday night which seemed to be devoted to discussion of Rev. Wright. I loved it! It was a white (I assume, but I guess I'm just going by accent and presupposition) NPR pundit letting two black religious scholars (as in each is ethnically black and part of historically/predominantly African American religious groups and students of African American religious groups) do most of the talking. It was overwhelmingly positive - maybe not "balanced" in the sense of having totally opposing sides represented on the same show, but it was a nice antidote to all of the sound bytes rebounding across the media lately about Obama and Rev. Wright. The discussion that I heard (I didn't stay to listen to the entire show) focused on talking about the prophetic or Jeremiatic (as in the prophet Jeremiah) tradition of preaching in American Christianity (African American and otherwise)--speaking truth to power, in other words. And they played *really long* clips of Wright's speeches and sermons, including a very long, unedited clip of the sermon from which the "God d**n America" sound byte comes from.

Basically, the context of that sound byte is that Rev. Wright talked (briefly) about how various world governments have failed and fallen (Germany, Russia, Japan), but God doesn't fail and doesn't change or go away. Then he spends considerably more time talking about the U.S. government. And he is explicitly and consistently talking about the *government* of the U.S., not Americans or America in general. He condemns historical events that are very recent and don't get talked about much: putting Japanese Americans in concentration camps during WWII, for example, and racism against blacks in public policy during the last generation (yes, the Civil Rights Era was only a generation ago). He also mentioned U.S. government treatment of Native Americans in a longer-ago context.

Basically, Wright said that we shouldn't say "God Bless America" in the context of the U.S. government doing bad things, but "God D**n America" whenever/as long as America does horrifically unjust things--not just against African Americans. He *always* qualified the "God D**n America" statement in that way: it was "D**n America for...", etc.

The commentators talked about how the point of prophetic preaching is to use striking, no-holds-barred rhetoric to point out ways in which a nation is falling short of what it is supposed to be, and holds up that ideal not only as a condemnation, but as a call to repentance. And it was clear that that was what Wright was doing in the larger context of his sermon. White fundie pastors do this all the time (James Dobson, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson)...and it's not "racist" then! Or compare Stanley Hauerwas.

My somewhat off-the-cuff reaction to the whole discussion is: white Americans are showing off their ignorance and their influence in the media, and their lack of willingness to listen and learn from Black Americans by construing righteously-angry speech with racist hate speech against whites, or as anti-American speech. *That* is why many of the attacks I have heard could be called attacks on the black church; because it is attacking the rightness of the black church's righteously-angry speech.
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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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