Defining “Natural”: A Philosophical Problem for Discussion

This is something on which I could use some help.

Preface:

“Entities” is to be understood in the broadest possible way. Entities may be existent or non-existent, simple or complex, irreducible or reducible, emergent or fundamental,[1] mental or non-mental, material or immaterial, etc. (Can you think of any significant bases I haven’t covered here?)

Let’s use “naturalism” to refer to the ontological claim that no entities exist that are non-natural.

Something is “non-natural” iff it is not identical to, reducible to, or wholly composed of natural entities.

Aim:

For present purposes, what we want is a definition of “natural” that allows naturalism to be an internally coherent thesis that someone can legitimately defend as a defeasible, a posteriori hypothesis. Naturalists claim that naturalism is a contingent truth.

Preferably, our definition of “natural” will leave room for the class of natural entities to contain more than the class of physical entities. Naturalism should not automatically entail physicalism.

Method:

I take it that in order for naturalism to be a posteriori and a contingent truth, it must be possible to present an argument for naturalism that is not circular or question-begging. (Perhaps the argument will finally be judged unsound; what matters right now is not the truth value of naturalism but its alleged contingency.)

I take it that the best argument available for naturalism is an argument from the empirical, meta-scientific observation of explanatory completeness[2] something like what follows (this a specifically physicalist version of the argument; I want to explore ways to modify the argument to make it apply to more inclusive forms of naturalism):

Scientific research of the last hundred years or so has had great success in finding physical (hence, natural) explanations for observed phenomena. There is no longer any reason (so the argument goes) to postulate the existence of any special, non-physical entities in order to account for observable, physical effects. Hence, the thesis of

“the ‘causal closure’ or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm,
according to which all physical effects can be accounted for by basic physical
causes (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of
fundamental forces)”[3]

has been well-confirmed. The methodological consideration of simplicity thus justifies the ontological hypothesis that the only fundamental entities that exist are those entities which make up the subject matter of physics.

First Try:

The history of science may be taken to confirm physicalism [see above] or else the thesis that there are no unexplainable phenomena. (Note: by definition, “phenomena” is restricted to the realm accessible to our observation). So naturalism could be the claim that we don’t need to posit any queer, non-scientific, supersensible entities in order to give (efficient) causal explanations of any observable phenomena. (We may consequently be justified to infer that there are no such entitites.) Everything we can observe can in principle be explained by other things that we observe, without recourse to the unobservable.

If we said that to be “natural” is to be observable (“non-natural” = “unobservable”), could we call the claim that nothing non-natural is a necessary component of an (efficient) causal explanation a scientific discovery, a posteriori, or a contingent truth?

No. Because something is observable by definition insofar as it causally generates observable effects; and if this is right, then it is an analytic truth, known a priori, “discovered” on reflection rather than observation, that all necessary posits of scientific explanations are observable, or “natural” on the above definition. (If I’m wrong and something can be non-observable but generate observable effects–subatomic particles, for example–then we have to reject our definition of “natural” because we want subatomic particles to count as “natural”, since the physical is supposed to be the paradigm case of the natural.)

Conclusion: This try hasn’t worked because the key claim turns out not to be a confirmable, defeasible, scientific hypothesis but rather a conceptual truth.

Help Desired!!

---

[1] By “fundamental” I intend “non-emergent”…can you please confirm or correct my terminology here?

[2] See David Papineau, “Naturalism”, §1.2-1.3, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/. I call this observation “meta-scientific” because it is a general observation about the fruits of recent scientific inquiry, rather than a particular observation that occurs within a particular scientific research program.

[3] Papineau, “Naturalism”, §1.2.
------

"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

Read the full post.

A little moral epistemology

I cycled to campus for the second morning in a row (the third time ever). I estimate it takes about 30 minutes (give or take 5). I saves me a dollar on bus fare and whatever I'd pay to ride a stationary bike at a fitness center (although I'm sure it isn't constant activity the way aerobic exercise should be--it's actually an easy ride).

No rain today, so my tires are cleaner and my brakes are working better than yesterday. :)

I'm noticing that I'm out of practice with regular, spontaneous praise and thanksgiving. I don't spend enough time outside, being, wondering, enjoying--as Michael's been saying, properly playing. :) I think that means I need to spend serious time in the Psalter.

---

Note to self:

One of the more serious challenges for moral realism is moral epistemology. How can we know normative truths?

I suspect that moral knowing involves empirical investigation (a posteriori knowing) into what contributes to a certain notion of eudaimonia/well-being/happiness/a good life (or, on the flip side, what contributes to a certain notion harm). Thus far I think I'm in basic agreement with the Cornell realists--the reigning metaethical naturalists. But this empirical knowledge is not where our normative concepts of, e.g., well-being come from.

I suspect that our concepts of well-being properly originate partly in revelation (a posteriori, but not perhaps empirical knowing) and are partly innate (a priori knowing). I understand innate concepts as concepts that we form for the first time when we first use them to cognize something in our experience. So to say that we have innate concepts of well-being means that when we experience well-being (or a privation of well-being)--either for ourselves or in observation of others' lives--we recognize it as such. Such cognition is not necessarily infallible just because it involves native concepts.

I am open to both special revelation filling out and correcting our conceptions of well-being and privation of well-being, and to some form of internal spiritual regeneration (a la Plantinga's WCB model) doing the same.

(Comments welcome from all on the above!)

------

"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

Read the full post.

Metaethics and First-Order Ethics

Ponderance of the day:
What is the relationship between metaethics and normative ethics? What are our purposes in metaethical inquiry? I suspect they are at bottom practical purposes, the same practical purposes at the root of our first-order ethical inquiry. If one of the primary functions of a metaethical theory is the *justification* (not merely the description) of first-order ethical judgments and their truth-aptness, this would seem to argue against certain expressivists' claim that metaethical discourse is morally detached, descriptive discourse by contrast with first-order moral discourse which is morally engaged, evaluative discourse. Further, if one of the purposes of metaethics is to aid in selection between competing normative ethical theories, it would be strange if our conclusions in metaethics had no consequences (even indirectly) on our normative ethical commitments.

These are articles I came across but have not really looked at much this afternoon:

Google Search: revisionist metaethics
JSTOR Links: Paul W. Taylor, The Normative Function of Metaethics, The Philosophical Review, 1958; Alan Gewirth, Metaethics and Moral Neutrality, Ethics, 1968. Reference from Taylor: Frederick A. Olafson, Meta-Ethics and the Moral Life, The Philosophical Review, 1956.


------

"He Himself is our Peace." (Eph 2)

Read the full post.