Defining “Natural”: A Philosophical Problem for Discussion

This is something on which I could use some help.

Preface:

“Entities” is to be understood in the broadest possible way. Entities may be existent or non-existent, simple or complex, irreducible or reducible, emergent or fundamental,[1] mental or non-mental, material or immaterial, etc. (Can you think of any significant bases I haven’t covered here?)

Let’s use “naturalism” to refer to the ontological claim that no entities exist that are non-natural.

Something is “non-natural” iff it is not identical to, reducible to, or wholly composed of natural entities.

Aim:

For present purposes, what we want is a definition of “natural” that allows naturalism to be an internally coherent thesis that someone can legitimately defend as a defeasible, a posteriori hypothesis. Naturalists claim that naturalism is a contingent truth.

Preferably, our definition of “natural” will leave room for the class of natural entities to contain more than the class of physical entities. Naturalism should not automatically entail physicalism.

Method:

I take it that in order for naturalism to be a posteriori and a contingent truth, it must be possible to present an argument for naturalism that is not circular or question-begging. (Perhaps the argument will finally be judged unsound; what matters right now is not the truth value of naturalism but its alleged contingency.)

I take it that the best argument available for naturalism is an argument from the empirical, meta-scientific observation of explanatory completeness[2] something like what follows (this a specifically physicalist version of the argument; I want to explore ways to modify the argument to make it apply to more inclusive forms of naturalism):

Scientific research of the last hundred years or so has had great success in finding physical (hence, natural) explanations for observed phenomena. There is no longer any reason (so the argument goes) to postulate the existence of any special, non-physical entities in order to account for observable, physical effects. Hence, the thesis of

“the ‘causal closure’ or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm,
according to which all physical effects can be accounted for by basic physical
causes (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of
fundamental forces)”[3]

has been well-confirmed. The methodological consideration of simplicity thus justifies the ontological hypothesis that the only fundamental entities that exist are those entities which make up the subject matter of physics.

First Try:

The history of science may be taken to confirm physicalism [see above] or else the thesis that there are no unexplainable phenomena. (Note: by definition, “phenomena” is restricted to the realm accessible to our observation). So naturalism could be the claim that we don’t need to posit any queer, non-scientific, supersensible entities in order to give (efficient) causal explanations of any observable phenomena. (We may consequently be justified to infer that there are no such entitites.) Everything we can observe can in principle be explained by other things that we observe, without recourse to the unobservable.

If we said that to be “natural” is to be observable (“non-natural” = “unobservable”), could we call the claim that nothing non-natural is a necessary component of an (efficient) causal explanation a scientific discovery, a posteriori, or a contingent truth?

No. Because something is observable by definition insofar as it causally generates observable effects; and if this is right, then it is an analytic truth, known a priori, “discovered” on reflection rather than observation, that all necessary posits of scientific explanations are observable, or “natural” on the above definition. (If I’m wrong and something can be non-observable but generate observable effects–subatomic particles, for example–then we have to reject our definition of “natural” because we want subatomic particles to count as “natural”, since the physical is supposed to be the paradigm case of the natural.)

Conclusion: This try hasn’t worked because the key claim turns out not to be a confirmable, defeasible, scientific hypothesis but rather a conceptual truth.

Help Desired!!

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[1] By “fundamental” I intend “non-emergent”…can you please confirm or correct my terminology here?

[2] See David Papineau, “Naturalism”, §1.2-1.3, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/. I call this observation “meta-scientific” because it is a general observation about the fruits of recent scientific inquiry, rather than a particular observation that occurs within a particular scientific research program.

[3] Papineau, “Naturalism”, §1.2.
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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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A little moral epistemology

I cycled to campus for the second morning in a row (the third time ever). I estimate it takes about 30 minutes (give or take 5). I saves me a dollar on bus fare and whatever I'd pay to ride a stationary bike at a fitness center (although I'm sure it isn't constant activity the way aerobic exercise should be--it's actually an easy ride).

No rain today, so my tires are cleaner and my brakes are working better than yesterday. :)

I'm noticing that I'm out of practice with regular, spontaneous praise and thanksgiving. I don't spend enough time outside, being, wondering, enjoying--as Michael's been saying, properly playing. :) I think that means I need to spend serious time in the Psalter.

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Note to self:

One of the more serious challenges for moral realism is moral epistemology. How can we know normative truths?

I suspect that moral knowing involves empirical investigation (a posteriori knowing) into what contributes to a certain notion of eudaimonia/well-being/happiness/a good life (or, on the flip side, what contributes to a certain notion harm). Thus far I think I'm in basic agreement with the Cornell realists--the reigning metaethical naturalists. But this empirical knowledge is not where our normative concepts of, e.g., well-being come from.

I suspect that our concepts of well-being properly originate partly in revelation (a posteriori, but not perhaps empirical knowing) and are partly innate (a priori knowing). I understand innate concepts as concepts that we form for the first time when we first use them to cognize something in our experience. So to say that we have innate concepts of well-being means that when we experience well-being (or a privation of well-being)--either for ourselves or in observation of others' lives--we recognize it as such. Such cognition is not necessarily infallible just because it involves native concepts.

I am open to both special revelation filling out and correcting our conceptions of well-being and privation of well-being, and to some form of internal spiritual regeneration (a la Plantinga's WCB model) doing the same.

(Comments welcome from all on the above!)

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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis

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Moral Judgments and Football Judgments

What is it that makes these judgments not examples of moral/ethical judgment?
And, what would you call these judgments isntead (chauvinistic judgments)?
I am trying to get at something essential to moral discourse here.

• You should support Italy for the World Cup title this year.
• You should support OSU against UM in the upcoming game.

I would like a more or less thoughtful response from all of my readers (however few or numerous they may be!).
Bonus points to anyone who can refer me to a scholarly essay and/or monograph that explicitly deals with this or a similar question.
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"He Himself is our Peace." (Eph 2)

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Politics of Jesus: Reflections I (of ?)

Reflections on
The Politics of Jesus
by John Howard Yoder

I

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1. Christocentric Ethics: The Normativity of Jesus in the Gospels
(from ch. 1, “The Possibility of a Messianic Ethic”)

At a popular level many Christians appeal to Jesus as a model for life and for right action. When I was a teenager (what seems like a very few short years ago), Christian teenagers were being taught (by the advertising media of the subculture, which of course infiltrated our church youth groups) to ask “What Would Jesus Do?”. (Incidentally, I have sometimes wondered: Would Jesus buy and wear WWJD bracelets and jewelry?) But how much direct help does scripture give us in answering that question? Does the New Testament present us with a substantive notion of what Jesus would do, based upon which we can do Christian normative ethics, or do Christian ethicists need to look elsewhere (i.e., in natural rather than special revelation) for our ethical foundations?

Yoder advances the hypothesis that the New Testament (read in the light of the Hebrew scriptural tradition that shaped its authors & audiences--Yoder is no proponent of the Marcionite heresy) does in fact give us a platform for social ethics. (The term “politics” in the title of the book is not meant to suggest that Jesus wants his disciples to take an active part in secular institutions of government; the term has a broader application to how his disciples are to live and act as members of society.) The project of The Politics of Jesus is to dig up confirming evidence for this hypothesis in the theology of the canonical New Testament writings. (Yoder does not consider himself qualified to attempt historical reconstructions of Jesus and his teachings that go behind the texts as we have them today; he comments more than once in a footnote, however, that the evidence in the canonical texts suggests that any such reconstruction would only strengthen the case for his hypothesis).

In his first chapter, Yoder surveys some arguments, common among Christian scholarship, for the thesis that Jesus and his teachings in the Gospels do not provide substantive normative answers for Christians’ questions in social ethics. Proponents of this thesis argue that Christians need to look elsewhere for answers to ethical questions; Yoder refers to these as “natural law” ethicists, broadly speaking. Here are some of the arguments of Yoder’s opponents: [note: my summary below does not exhaust Yoder’s presentation at this point of his argument]

1. Jesus gives only an interim ethic
Since Jesus expected the end of the present age to come soon, his ethical teachings became more and more irrelevant as the Church came to terms with the delay of the parousia. “Thus at any point where social ethics must deal with problems of duration, Jesus quite clearly can be of no help. If the impermanence of the social order is an axiom underlying the ethic of Jesus, then obviously the survival of this order for centuries ahs already invalidated the axiom.” (16)


2. Jesus gives only a personal (i.e., non-public) ethics
Jesus’ ethical teachings were intended to apply only to interpersonal relationships, not to social problems of a large scale. “His radical personalization of all ethical problems is only possible in a village sociology where knowing everyone and having time to treat everyone as a person is culturally an available possibility. … There is thus in the ethic of Jesus no intention to speak substantially to the problems of complex organization, of institutions and offices, cliques and power and crowds.” (16-17)


3. Jesus gives only an ethic for the powerless minority
Christians have ascended to positions of power in society (e.g., economic and political power). But “Jesus and his early followers lived in a world over which they had no control.” Christians in positions of power must look elsewhere for moral guidance in making the kinds of decisions they have the responsibility to make. “…the Christian is [today] obligated to answer questions which Jesus did not face. The individual Christian, or all Christians together, must accept responsibilities that were inconceivable in Jesus’ situation.” (17)


4. Jesus gives only spiritual (not social or ethical) teachings
Everything Jesus taught must be interpreted in light of the gospel of personal salvation. The point of his ethical teachings was not our obedience, but some spiritual aim, such as a recognition of our need for grace. The point of his life was not his ethical teachings, and we should not take his behavior with respect to social authorities as a model for our own, because Jesus’ life had the unique purpose of ending with a vicarious sacrificial atonement. The primary concern of the Christian life is not being ethical, but trusting in grace alone for our salvation. “For Roman Catholics this act of justification may be found to be in correlation with the sacraments, and for Protestants with one’s self-understanding, in response to the proclaimed Word; but never shall it be correlated with ethics.” (19)



Reflection #1
Response to (1):
(a) Perhaps to be faithful to the teachings of our Lord, we should continue to live as if the end of the present age is imminent. Perhaps we should not make our choices based on the assumption that the money we put in the stock market today will be there for our retirement in thirty or forty years. Perhaps we should give up all our allegiances to earthly institutions, knowing that they will not last.
(b) Perhaps the end of the age did come in Jesus’ lifetime, or immediately following his death & resurrection. Perhaps his ethics were not for the short span of his life only, but for the new age in which we presently live. Again, perhaps we should abandon all allegiances to the institutions of the old age.
(c) Remember that if there was a development in the theology of the early Church, during the writing of the New Testament books, toward accommodating the delay of the parousia, Jesus’ teachings as recorded in Matthew and the other Gospels were among the latest canonical works to be produced by the early Church. So these teachings should be intended by the scriptural authors as relevant for the long-term wait for Christ’s return at the end of the age.

Response to (2):
(a) Perhaps we should fight the cultural trend of depersonalization and establish communities of our own in which to live out these personal ethics. Perhaps we should not concern ourselves with larger social, global problems—or perhaps we should not approach such problems from a large perspective. Perhaps we should not let the ethics of complex organization override the ethics of interpersonal relationships.
(b) Jesus did confront some institutional figures in his lifetime: the Temple, the Sanhedrin, Herod, Pilate (and not just during Passion week!).

Responses to (3):
This is a tough one. Should we remain a powerless witnessing minority, and shun power when it is offered to us? Or should we be distinctively different when in power? If Jesus teaches us to love our enemies, what will this mean for a Christian who is elected as commander in chief of the United States armed forces?

Response to (4):
The gospel in both testaments clearly (as it seems to me) involves a call to those who have accepted grace to live out God’s law, and the commandments of Christ—a call that we are expected to fulfill, not to perpetually fall short of.
How to see Jesus’ journey toward the cross: as both political and spiritual, only spiritual, only political, or something that defies the distinction of political and spiritual?—this is a challenge for me.


Reflection #2
Consequences for our Christianity:
Either Jesus (and more broadly the New Testament revelation) introduces into our lives a distinctive ethic, or else it does not. Where does either option leave us, as Christians?

Suppose we are forced to look to natural revelation for our ethics.
“Is there such a thing as a Christian ethic at all? If there be no specifically Christian ethic but only natural human ethics as held to by Christians among others, does this thoroughgoing abandon of particular substance apply to ethical truth only? Why not to all other truth as well?
…what becomes of the meaning of incarnation if Jesus is not normative man? If he is a man but not normative, is this not the ancient ebionitic heresy? If he be somehow authoritative but not in his humanness, is this not a new gnosticism?”(22)


Suppose Jesus does call us to a distinctive set of ethical standards.
Must we all then turn our lives upside-down?

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"He Himself is our Peace." (Eph 2)

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Metaethics and First-Order Ethics

Ponderance of the day:
What is the relationship between metaethics and normative ethics? What are our purposes in metaethical inquiry? I suspect they are at bottom practical purposes, the same practical purposes at the root of our first-order ethical inquiry. If one of the primary functions of a metaethical theory is the *justification* (not merely the description) of first-order ethical judgments and their truth-aptness, this would seem to argue against certain expressivists' claim that metaethical discourse is morally detached, descriptive discourse by contrast with first-order moral discourse which is morally engaged, evaluative discourse. Further, if one of the purposes of metaethics is to aid in selection between competing normative ethical theories, it would be strange if our conclusions in metaethics had no consequences (even indirectly) on our normative ethical commitments.

These are articles I came across but have not really looked at much this afternoon:

Google Search: revisionist metaethics
JSTOR Links: Paul W. Taylor, The Normative Function of Metaethics, The Philosophical Review, 1958; Alan Gewirth, Metaethics and Moral Neutrality, Ethics, 1968. Reference from Taylor: Frederick A. Olafson, Meta-Ethics and the Moral Life, The Philosophical Review, 1956.


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"He Himself is our Peace." (Eph 2)

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