Wednesday, May 28, 2008

Reductionism and Supervenience: A Proof in Modal Logic

Below, I prove that if reductionism is true then the supervenience thesis is true.
(See Simon Blackburn, “Supervenience Revisited” in his Essays in Quasi-Realism, 1993.)

Reductionism: N (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx)

Necessarily, for all x, if x is correctly described by a natural property description represented by G*, then x has the moral property represented by F.

The Supervenience Thesis: N (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))

Necessarily, if something exists that has moral property F and is correctly described by G*, and its being F supervenes on its being G* [or, conversely, it’s being G* underlies its being F], then for all y, if y is G*, then y is F.


All modal operators here are to be understood as involving analytic or conceptual necessity/possibility. (As opposed to, say, metaphysical or natural necessity/possibility).

Supposedly G. E. Moore’s open question argument gives good reason to reject reductionism. Reductionism is equivalent to what Moore called the “naturalistic fallacy”. Blackburn argues that anti-reductionists lack a good explanation for their acceptance of the supervenience thesis.


1. N (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx)
// ∴ N (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))

2. ASM: ~ N ((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))       AIP
3. P ~((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))          from 2
4. W1 ~((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))       from 3
5. W1 ~(~(∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ∨ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))       from 4
6. W1 ~~(∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) & ~(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)       from 5
7. W1 ~(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy) & ~~(∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx))       from 6
8. W1 ~(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)                     from 7
9. W1 (∃y)~(G*y ⊃ Fy)                     from 8
10. W1 (∃y)~(~G*y ∨ Fy)                     from 9
11. W1 (∃y)(~~G*y & ~Fy)                     from 10
12. W1 ~~G*a & ~Fa                     from 11
13. W1 G*a & ~Fa                     from 12
14. W1 G*a                     from 13
15. W1 (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx)                     from 1
16. W1 G*a ⊃ Fa                     from 15
17. W1 Fa                     from 14, 16
18. W1 ~Fa & G*a                     from 13
19. W1 ~Fa                     from 18
20. W1 Fa & ~Fa                     from 17, 19

21. N (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy))                     from 2-20, IP
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"Make me a channel of Your Peace."

-St. Francis


2 comments:

M. Anderson said...

It's been a while since you posted this, but I just noticed something. It seems like your is basically saying this: If everything is reducible to natural properties, then there is a specific subset of things (that is, supervening things) reducible to natural properties. Is this correct?

S. Coulter said...

Because I'm using Blackburn's formalization, and he avoids quantifing over properties, F & G* stand for some particular moral and some particular natural property/property description, respectively.

So what I'm saying in the proof is that if some moral property is reducible to some natural property, then that moral property supervenes on that natural property.

But this is trivially true.
Usually philosophers want supervenience without reduction.