Metaethics and First-Order Ethics

Ponderance of the day:
What is the relationship between metaethics and normative ethics? What are our purposes in metaethical inquiry? I suspect they are at bottom practical purposes, the same practical purposes at the root of our first-order ethical inquiry. If one of the primary functions of a metaethical theory is the *justification* (not merely the description) of first-order ethical judgments and their truth-aptness, this would seem to argue against certain expressivists' claim that metaethical discourse is morally detached, descriptive discourse by contrast with first-order moral discourse which is morally engaged, evaluative discourse. Further, if one of the purposes of metaethics is to aid in selection between competing normative ethical theories, it would be strange if our conclusions in metaethics had no consequences (even indirectly) on our normative ethical commitments.

These are articles I came across but have not really looked at much this afternoon:

Google Search: revisionist metaethics
JSTOR Links: Paul W. Taylor, The Normative Function of Metaethics, The Philosophical Review, 1958; Alan Gewirth, Metaethics and Moral Neutrality, Ethics, 1968. Reference from Taylor: Frederick A. Olafson, Meta-Ethics and the Moral Life, The Philosophical Review, 1956.


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"He Himself is our Peace." (Eph 2)